Introduction
In general, studies under oligopolistic market structure investigate effects of environmental taxes under oligopolistic market from the angle of game theory and information economics, generally with partial equilibrium analyses or micro-model approaches. Most literature based on game theory analyze the effects of environmental taxes on micro-individuals such as the companies, victims of pollution, polluting emission and output as well as the level of optimal environmental tax, other than the effects on growth, employment, income distribution, etc. In general, environmental taxes are found adverse to the environmental quality, growth or welfare, and there is a trade-off between environmental quality and growth or social welfare, namely "double dividend" always fails under oligopolistic market. Tanguay (2001) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) find that environmental taxes harms the environment and even the social welfare, thus, "double dividend" generally does not exists. Literature based on information economics mainly holds that environmental taxes are not good for environmental improvement as asymmetric information adds up to costs of economic business and therefore environmental taxes cannot lead to "double dividend" under oligopolistic market (Kim and Chang, 1993; Pezzy and Park, 1998; Antelo and Loureiro, 2009 ). This paper investigates the effects of environmental taxes under a duopolistic industry in the framework of Stackelberg game. Our study find the following results: environmental tax may be adverse to technology innovation in oligopolistic industries; "double dividend" hypothesis always fails; the optimal environmental tax is closely related to the technology distribution of oligopolistic industries; and environmental taxes are possibly adverse to the environment.
Basic Model
Antelo and Loureiro (2009) study the effects of environmental taxes in the framework of Cournot competition, and this paper will move on to Stackelberg analysis.
Behaviors of Companies
Suppose that there are in the oligopolistic industry two companies A and B, which produce homogeneous goods. And the two companies compete in terms of quantities under the framework of Stackelberg game, where A is the first mover and B is the follower. As for the demand function confronted by the companies, the model continues to use that in Antelo and Loureiro (2009):
where Q is the aggregate output of the two companies, namely (2) Besides, the discharge of effluents will cause damage to the environment and this damage is measured by D:
where d is a parameter measuring the environmental awareness (or the preference of polluting distribution) of the government and the larger d is, the higher the environmental requirements of the government. E is the aggregate polluting effluent, namely
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E e e = + . Either company may be polluting or clean, which depends on the technology they employ. However, different technologies lead to different costs. We suppose that the costs of companies (include the abatement costs) are in proportion to the output level, namely i i c q . Thus, the companies' average costs equals to the marginal costs (a constant). To make it simple, we suppose that when the government does not impose environmental taxes, the cost of the polluting company is 0 and that of the clean company is c, as the adoption of abatement technology increases the cost.
(4)
The objective of the company is to choose an output level so as to maximize its profits, taking into consideration the environmental policy, technology and costs, etc.
Behaviors of the Government
The government imposes a specific environmental tax i T on the polluting effluent, so as to regulate pollution. The target of the government is to improve the environmental quality and maximize the social welfare at the same time. To simplify the problem, suppose that the administrative costs in the process of taxation can be ignored. As for the social welfare function, we employ the function in classical literature: Besides, if the optimal environmental tax is positive, the outputs of polluting companies are no less than those under the circumstances with no environmental taxes.
Solution of the Model
The profit function of company i (i=A, B) is: 
，
The equilibrium output, effluent and social welfare are respectively: (9) Substitute (9) into (7) and (8), we can obtain the optimal output, effluent and social welfare:
(10) Starting from equilibrium without any environmental regulation, the environmental tax reform indeed lowers the effluent and improves the environment. But the output levels of both companies decrease as the optimal environmental tax is positive. Environmental tax reforms obtain "environmental dividend" rather than "growth dividend". Therefore, there is no "double dividend".
A is polluting and B is clean. When company A is polluting and B is clean, we have (11) and (12), we obtain the optimal output, effluent and social welfare (15) The above analyses show that the sign of optimal environmental tax is uncertain and when the environmental awareness of the government and the abatement cost satisfy some condition, the optimal environmental tax is negative, namely the optimal environmental policy is to subsidize pollution. When the optimal environmental tax is positive, the implementation of environmental taxes increases the clean company B's output but decreases that of the polluting company A and the aggregate output as well as the polluting effluent. The implementation of environmental taxes generates "environmental dividend" but not "growth dividend", thus, there is no "double dividend" effect on economic growth. However, when the optimal environmental tax is negative, environmental taxes decrease the output of clean company B but increase that of company A and the aggregate output as well as the polluting effluent. Environmental tax reforms lead to "economic dividend", but the "environmental dividend" disappears. Thus, there is no "double dividend, either.
A is clean while B is polluting . Then, the optimal environmental tax is 3 10 6 1 9 1 (16) and (17), we can obtain the optimal output, effluent and social welfare: (20) The above analyses show that the sign of optimal environmental tax is uncertain. Starting from equilibrium without environmental taxes, environmental taxes lead to "environmental dividend" but do not promote economic growth when optimal environmental tax is positive and that environmental taxes promote economic growth but deteriorate the environment when optimal environmental tax is negative. Therefore, there is no "double dividend". (21) When the two companies both employ clean technology, there are no effects of environmental tax reforms on the output levels. In fact, technology innovation needs costs, imposing negative effects on the output, leading to the lowest output among the four technology distributions. If neither companies innovates technology and discharge pollution, the industry can realize the same output level at lower costs.
Conclusion
First, environmental tax is a more efficient policy to protect environment relative to compulsory administrative regulations, but is adverse to technology innovation. Second, there is generally a trade-off between economic growth and environmental protection. "Growth double dividend" fails but "welfare double dividend" exists under some conditions. Third, the optimal environmental tax depends on the technology distribution of the oligopolistic industry and environmental taxes will not inevitably lead to the improvement of environmental quality. Fourth, the technology distribution of oligopolistic industry and the relative positions of oligopolistic companies have great impacts on the environmental and economic effects of environmental taxes.
